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M. Arréat defends himself against the charge of having founded esthetics upon perception (pp. 70 ff.). A series of anecdotes is given, illustrating the reënforcement or weakening of esthetic perceptions by associations (pp. 73 ff.).

The second essay is a review of recent works on esthetics (pp. 83-118). The third is again a 'confession' of the kind, origin, and control of imagery in literary creativeness; five short stories and two poems afford the matter for the observations made. M. Arréat explicitly denies every moral purpose in writing these; he states that "morality is a condition of dramatic pleasure, but could not be its immediate end" (p. 122). Attention is also called to the 'schemes of rendition' or 'images of interpretation' which characterize the creative imagination of literary men, giving the latter their 'easy syntax,' 'rhyming power,' 'flow of words,' etc.

The fourth essay is a collection of fifteen cases of persistent and (supposedly) peculiar associations (pp. 133-140). These do not appear to be remarkable as instances, nor yet to have been very well analyzed. The concluding "observations made upon a musical composer" (pp. 141-158) are fairly numerous, but do not appear either exact or extensive enough to serve as more than a simple illustration of general facts already fairly well known. The writer indiscreetly ventures to draw lengthy conclusions from this single case.

The volume contains many illustrations of standard esthetic 'phenomena' which are very well suited to class-room use.

WALTER B. PITKIN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils. Erster Band: Analyse des Urteils.

Von ERNST SCHRADER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1905. — pp. viii, 222.

Dr. Schrader has set himself the task of writing a comprehensive treatise on the psychology of the judgment. His introductory volume, *Zur Grundzüge der Psychologie des Urteils*, appeared in 1903; the task is to be concluded by a two-volume work, *Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils*, of which the present book constitutes the opening volume. The book now under review is entitled *Analyse des Urteils*; it proposes to analyze the judgment into its elements, and to show how these enter into combination to form the judgment. The closing volume of the series, *Tendenzen der Urteilsbildung*, will deal with certain general factors which are operative in the formation of judgments but whose presence cannot ordinarily be discovered in isolated instances; among these factors the author enumerates the influence of inherited tendencies, of training, of social environment, and the like.

Dr. Schrader's position is already familiar to readers of his introductory volume. The present volume is concerned, in the main, with a more detailed working out of the argument there presented. This is done under the following headings: "Introduction," pp. 1-34; "The Empirical In-

vestigation of the Judgment," pp. 35-67; "The Beginnings of the Concept 'False,'" pp. 68-90; "Critically Corrective Thinking," pp. 91-117; "Psychical Activity," pp. 118-147; "Verbal and Non-Verbal Thinking," "Substitution," pp. 148-155; "Subject, Predicate, Copula," pp. 156-200; "Appendices," pp. 201-222.

The author accepts Aristotle's definition of the judgment as that phenomenon of thought in which truth or error is or may be present. He points out that perceptions, memories, and other association-complexes are indifferent to truth and falsity. To mere groups of ideas we may or may not grant assent; and the phenomena of grouping are still identical in the two cases. Judgment is therefore something more than perception and association. And it follows that the psychological principles to which one has recourse in explaining perception and association are inadequate to an explanation of the judgment. It becomes essential, therefore, to introduce another psychological principle; but where is one to find it? Consistency forbids our appeal to a psychical activity, because the psychologist who commits himself to a purely empirical procedure cannot legitimately employ a principle which this procedure fails to reveal or to confirm. The experience of error furnishes a solution of the problem. If every mental process ran its course smoothly and without interruption, if we were never obliged to retrace our steps and correct our initial apprehensions, our mental life would find an analogy in the running of a well-regulated machine. And the laws which explain the mechanical grouping of ideas would explain the whole of the mental life.

But it frequently happens that we find ourselves in error. Having secured new evidence, we criticise and correct our previous apprehensions. An incident to which Schrader makes constant reference will illustrate this procedure. "I see in the distance a person whom I at first take to be a woman. On coming to closer range, however, I observe that the person is pushing a wheel-barrow. Then I perceive that it is not a woman but a workman." The experience of error is itself traceable to the *negative relation* which obtains between the ideas 'woman' and 'pushing a wheel-barrow.' This 'negative relation of ideas' is the *fons et origo* of the judgment. A closer scrutiny of the incident cited reveals to the author two interesting facts. One idea is expelled and permanently excluded from consciousness by another idea; the vanquished idea is dismembered in the struggle, and a portion of it (the colored clothing of the woman) is carried over and incorporated into the victorious idea (workman).

It is to be noted, however, that, on the lower levels of consciousness at least, mature judgment need not be involved in such a process as has been cited. But the germs of the judgment are present; for it is in the 'negative relation of ideas' that we find the origin of the concept 'false,' and the concept 'true' appears as a later product of the same factor. To the 'negative relation,' then, we owe our developed capacity for critical emendation, or critically corrective thought. In the higher stages of develop-

ment, the presence of the essential factor is obscured by the introduction of symbolic mental operations (in accordance with Taine's theory of substitution).

Ideas, then, are to be conceived as arranged in a hierarchy of mutual relationships. They possess the capacity to attract and repel each other in varying degree. When an idea enters consciousness, it is able to expel those which are incompatible with it; it is equally potent to bring to consciousness those for which it has an affinity. Dr. Schrader's theory may be brought into relation with the principle of association. He emphasizes the negative phases of mental grouping, and gives a wholly new aspect to the older theory. That he has been successful in his search for a principle which shall differentiate the judgment from the purely mechanical mental combinations can scarcely be maintained. In the author's conception of the mental life, ideas suppress each other, exclude each other from consciousness, lift their fellows over the threshold, and the like. The whole procedure is described in ultra-Herbartian terms.

In a word, Dr. Schrader finds defects in all of the current theories of the judgment. Those which assume a psychical activity he rejects outright; he would accept a theory of the association type, but only after he has made an important supplementation to the recognized laws of association. The familiar principles of perception and of association can do no more than explain how the raw material is assembled for the judgment. The judgment itself is a product of the 'negative relation of ideas.'

J. W. BAIRD.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Critique de la doctrine de Kant. Par CHARLES RENOUVIER. Publié par LOUIS PRAT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1906. — pp. iv, 440.

In the editor's preface we are told that this work was begun when Renouvier had reached the age of eighty-seven and that it was not quite completed at the venerable philosopher's death. In view of this, the mental energy, acuteness of critical faculty, and power of subtle analysis here shown seem marvellous. The book can stand on its own merits as a philosophical treatise of permanent value, and no allowance need be made by the reader for the shortcomings usually incident to old age. Renouvier's main purpose has been the exposure of the dogmatic element in Kant's philosophy, and especially the illegitimacy of his concept of the *noumenon*, on which depends his doctrine of the real as infinite and unconditioned. It is, of course, nothing new to find this by no means invulnerable side of the Kantian system made the subject of attack; but Renouvier's criticism not only is exceptionally keen-sighted, but is made from an unusual standpoint. For the most part it has been those whose philosophy leaned towards naturalism or positivism who have animadverted upon Kant's juggling with the notion of 'Ding-an-sich,' — using it now as the real cause or substrate of the phenomenal world, now as merely the limiting idea by which human